This paper deals with double lobbying: several bureaucrats participate in joint lobbying to get a high total departmental budget, but they also engage in antagonistic lobbying to reap as high a share of the total budget as possible. The antagonistic lobbying constitutes a contest among the...

We apply an indirect evolutionary approach to player’ perceived prize valuations in contests. Evolution in finite populations leads to preferences that overstate the prize’s material value and induce overexpenditure. We establish an equivalence between the behavior evolutionarily stable...

We compare two contest. Decentralized in which there are several independent contests with non overlapping contestants and Centralized in which all contestants fight for a unique prize which is the sum of all prizes in the small contests. We study the relationship between payoffs and efforts...

The purpose of this paper is to propose a symmetric two player general contest model in order to study the relationship between equilibria and crucial structural parameters of the model. In particular, given a general specification of the players' set of possible entries, of the agents' utility...

We conduct a laboratory experiment to compare the fairness and intensity of round-robin tournaments with three symmetric players, a single prize, and two alternative match formats. Matches are either organized as lottery contests or all-pay auctions. Whereas we confirm the theoretical prediction...