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Designing contests between heterogeneous contestants : an experimental study of tie-breaks and bid-caps in all-pay auctions

Llorente-Saguer, Aniol; Sheremeta, Roman M.; Szech, Nora - 2016

A well-known theoretical result in the contest literature is that greater heterogeneity decreases performance of contestants because of the "discouragement effect." Leveling the playing field by favoring weaker contestants through bid-caps and favorable tie-breaking rules can reduce the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011489403

Limited capacity in project selection : competition through evidence production

Boleslavsky, Raphael; Cotton, Christopher - 2015 - Current version: June 2015

An organization must decide which proposals to fund. In evaluating the proposals, the organization may rely on those applying for funding to produce evidence about the merits of their own proposals. We consider the role of a capacity constraint preventing the organization from funding all...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011295651

Optimal favoritism in all-pay auctions and lottery contests

Franke, Jörg; Leininger, Wolfgang; Wasser, Cédric - 2016

. In the all-pay auction, head starts are more effective than biases while optimally combining both instruments even yields …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011586301

Designing contests between heterogeneous contestants : an experimental study of tie-breaks and bid-caps in all-pay auctions

Llorente-Saguer, Aniol; Sheremeta, Roman M.; Szech, Nora - 2016

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011472073

Designing contests between heterogeneous contestants : an experimental study of tie-breaks and bid-caps in all-pay auctions

Llorente-Saguer, Aniol; Sheremeta, Roman M.; Szech, Nora - 2016

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011473683

Designing contests between heterogeneous contestants : an experimental study of tie-breaks and bid-caps in all-pay auctions

Llorente-Saguer, Aniol; Sheremeta, Roman M.; Szech, Nora - 2016

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011473887

Designing contests between heterogeneous contestants : an experimental studie of tie-breaks and bid-caps in all-pay Auctions

Llorente-Saguer, Aniol; Sheremeta, Roman M.; Szech, Nora - 2020

Contests are well-established mechanisms for political lobbying, innovation, rentseeking, incentivizing workers, and advancing R&D. A well-known theoretical result in the contest literature is that greater heterogeneity decreases investments of contestants because of the "discouragement effect."...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012426931

Round-robin tournaments in the lab : lottery contests vs. all-pay auctions

Lauber, Arne; March, Christoph; Sahm, Marco - 2025

We conduct a laboratory experiment to compare the fairness and intensity of round-robin tournaments with three symmetric players, a single prize, and two alternative match formats. Matches are either organized as lottery contests or all-pay auctions. Whereas we confirm the theoretical prediction...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015202740

Extremism Drives Out Moderation

Klose, Bettina S. - 2012

, we show that substituting the auction contest success function for the lottery contest success function in a conflict may … radicals. Our results demonstrate the importance of the choice of the institutions of conflict, as modeled by the contest …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013106913

Extremism drives out moderation

Klose, Bettina; Kovenock J., Dan - 2012

, we show that substituting the auction contest success function for the lottery contest success function in a conflict may …. -- conflict ; all-pay auction ; identity-dependent externalities ; radicalism ; extremism ; contest success function … radicals. Our results demonstrate the importance of the choice of the institutions of conflict, as modeled by the contest …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009533958