effect of reducing cross-price elasticities and thus that manufacturer advertising can be a source of channel conflict. We …-price elasticities between their products, (2) channel conflict need not arise, even when the sole purpose of advertising is to affect …

is in a search engine's interest to allow some click fraud. Under full information in a second-price auction, if % of … clicks are fraudulent, advertisers will lower their bids by %, leaving the auction outcome and search engine revenues … unchanged. However, if we allow for uncertainty in the amount of click fraud or change the auction type to include a click …

two-sided competition on the actions and source of profits of media firms. One main conclusion we reach is that media … firms may charge higher content prices in a duopoly than in a monopoly. This happens because competition for advertisers can … contrast to those in a regular one-sided product market, in which competition typically lowers product prices and profits. We …

into the channel system provides “buffering” to the manufacturers from price competition when their products are highly …

products. We find that featuring is associated with a price premium and serves as a mechanism to mitigate competition among …