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Sheremeta, Roman M. - 2011

We find the sufficient conditions for the existence of multiple equilibria in Tullock-type contests and show that asymmetric equilibria may arise even under symmetric prize and cost structures. We also identify contests in the literature where multiple equilibria exist under reasonably weak...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013128752

Strategic Alliances in a Veto Game : An Experimental Study

Kim, Chulyoung; Kim, Sang-Hyun; Lee, Jinhyuk; Lee, Joosung - 2021

In a veto game, we investigate the effects of "buyout" which allows non-veto players strategically form an intermediate coalition. We report two main experimental findings in this paper. First, the frequency of intermediate coalition formation is much lower than predicted by theory, regardless...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013243564

Farsighted Stability With Heterogeneous Expectations

Bloch, Francis - 2019

This paper analyzes farsighted stability when agents have heterogeneous expectations over the dominance paths. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012868985

Generalized Contest Success Functions

Rai, Birendra K. - 2007

The key element of models of contest is the Contest Success Function (CSF) which speciamp;#64257;es the winning probabilities of agents. The existing axiomatizations of CSFs assume that contestants can make only one type of investment. This paper generalizes these axiomatizations to the case where...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012728641

Internal versus external rent-seeking with in-group inequality and public good provision

Bakshi, Dripto; Dasgupta, Indraneel - 2021

inequality between the rich and others within a community depresses between-group conflict. Within-group conflict may fall as … well. The "paradox of power" is violated for both kinds of conflict - better-endowed individuals are more successful in the … internal conflict, while better-endowed groups are more successful in the external conflict. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012703084

Citizens, Dictators and Networks : A Game Theory Approach

Perez-Oviedo, Wilson Amadeo - 2016

In a society composed of citizens and a dictator: what are the conditions for a successful citizens' revolt? What kind of strategies do governments follow to prevent such revolts? In this paper we argue that the concept of networks is a very powerful tool to understand these issues, as shown...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012707235

Too big to prevail : the paradox of power in coalition formation

Ke, Changxia; Morath, Florian; Newell, Anthony; Page, Lionel - 2021

In standard coalition games, players try to form a coalition to secure a prize and a coalition agreement specifies how the prize is to be split among its members. However, in practical situations where coalitions are formed, the actual split of the prize often takes place after the coalition...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012550309

Tullock brings perseverance and suspense to tug-of-war

Karagözoğlu, Emin; Sağlam, Hüseyin Çağri; Turan, … - 2020

stark contrast to a model of tug-of-war with an all pay auction CSF - players exert positive efforts until the very last …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012165990

Too big to prevail : the paradox of power in coalition formation

Ke, Changxia; Morath, Florian; Newell, Anthony; Page, Lionel - 2021

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012494898

Internal v. external rent-seeking with in-group inequality and public good provision

Bakshi, Dripto; Dasgupta, Indraneel - 2021

-group conflict. Within group conflict may fall as well. The 'paradox of power' is violated for both kinds of conflict - better … endowed individuals are more successful in the internal conflict, while better-endowed groups are more successful in the … external conflict. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012792712