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Equilibrium and efficiency in the tug-of-war

Konrad, Kai A.; Kovenock, Daniel J. - 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003096073

Equilibrium and efficiency in the tug-of-war

Konrad, Kai A.; Kovenock, Daniel J. - 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003130864

Eternal peace in the tug-of-war?

Häfner, Samuel - In: Economic theory 74 (2022) 4, pp. 1057-1101

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013488789

Equilibrium and efficiency in the tug-of-war

Konrad, Kai A. (contributor); … - 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003218121

Equilibrium and efficiency in the tug-of-war

Konrad, Kai A. (contributor); … - 2005

the opportunity to engage in a sequence of battles in an attempt to win the war. Each battle is an all-pay auction in … states of the game, the "tipping states", which are determined by the contestants' relative strengths, their distances to … by which the allocation of prizes are governed by possibly repeated conflict. Our results contribute to an explanation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003202472

Biasing Unbiased Dynamic Contests

Barbieri, Stefano - 2018

We consider a best-of-three Tullock contest between two ex-ante identical players. An effort-maximizing designer commits to a vector of player-specific biases (advantages or disadvantages). In our benchmark model the designer chooses victory-dependent biases (i.e., the biases depend on the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012918987

Strategically Equivalent Contests

Chowdhury, Subhasish M.; Sheremeta, Roman M. - 2013

We use a Tullock-type contest to show that intuitively and structurally different contests can be strategically equivalent. Strategically equivalent contests generate the same best response functions and, as a result, the same efforts. Two strategically equivalent contests, however, may yield...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014164442

Sorting in Iterated Incumbency Contests

Häfner, Samuel - 2017

This paper analyzes incumbency contests in a large population setting. Incumbents repeatedly face different challengers, holding on to their positions until defeated in a contest. Defeated incumbents turn into challengers until they win a contest against an incumbent, thereby regaining an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012968580

Self-Allocation in Contests

Bernergard, Axel - 2017

We consider contestants who must choose exactly one contest, out of several, to participate in. We show that when the contest technology is of a certain type, or when the number of contestants is large, a self-allocation equilibrium, i.e., one where no contestant would wish to change his choice...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012947451

The Equivalence of Contests

Chowdhury, Subhasish M. - 2010

We use a Tullock-type contest model to show that intuitively and structurally different contests can be strategically and revenue equivalent to each other. We consider a two-player contest, where outcome-contingent payoffs are linear functions of prizes, own effort, and the effort of the rival....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013143626