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We introduce three extensions of the Hirshleifer–Skaperdas conflict game to study experimentally the effects of post-conflict … altogether, often after substantial initial conflict. To attain peace, players must first engage in costly signaling by making …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010785206
of the group in the conflict and its members’ utilities vary with the degree of within-group inequality. We show that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010840249
A contest is a game where several players compete for winning prizes by expending costly efforts. We assume that the outcome of a contest is an ordered partition of the set of players (a ranking) and a contest success function assigns a probability to each possible outcome as a function of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010840260
We study how conflict in a contest game is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to … punish each other. Our main motivation stems from the analysis of socio-political conflict. The relevant theoretical … prediction in our setting is that conflict expenditures are independent of group size and independent of whether punishment is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851463
We study endogenous group formation in tournaments employing experimental three-player contests. We find that players in endogenously formed alliances cope better with the moral hazard problem in groups than players who are forced into an alliance. Also, players who are committed to expending...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010860231
This paper considers evolutionarily stable decisions about whether to initiate violent conflict rather than accepting a … peaceful resource allocations that are rejected in favor of violent conflict, compared to the Nash equilibrium outcomes …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010983244
We study endogenous group formation in tournaments employing experimental threeplayer contests. We find that players in endogenously formed alliances cope better with the moral hazard problem in groups than players who are forced into an alliance. Also, players who are committed to expending...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010983248
Victorious alliances often fight about the spoils of war. We consider experimentally when members of victorious alliances accept a peaceful division of the spoils, and when they fight against each other, and how the inability to commit to a peaceful division affects their effort contributions in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010990338
outside enemy, 'brothers in arms' may already anticipate future internal conflict about dividing the spoils of winning …; however, this subsequent internal conflict does not discourage alliance members from expending much effort in the contest …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010990349
context of a finitely repeated intergroup contest and demonstrate that conflict expenditures are significantly higher if … intergroup conflict and group rent-seeking. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011048619