We study how conflict in a contest game is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to … punish each other. Our main motivation stems from the analysis of socio-political conflict. The relevant theoretical … prediction in our setting is that conflict expenditures are independent of group size and independent of whether punishment is …

potential. Applications include international conflict, litigation, and elections. Even though only a peaceful agreement avoids … a loss of resources, if this loss is small enough, then any mechanism must assign a positive probability of conflict. We … show how the likelihood of conflict outbreak depends on the distribution of power between the agents and their information …

We study how conflict in contest games is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to … punish each other. Our motivation stems from the analysis of socio-political conflict. The theoretical prediction is that … conflict expenditures are independent of group size and of whether punishment is available or not. We find, first, that …

setting of civil conflict, where they discuss electoral outcomes in Northern Ireland and Yugoslavia before and after …

production and conflict model. Six economics examples illustrate the unrealistic implications of rent seeking analysis. …

We analyze a model of conflict with endogenous choice of effort, where subsets of the contenders may force the …

We study how conflict in contest games is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to … punish each other. Our motivation stems from the analysis of socio-political conflict. The theoretical prediction is that … conflict expenditures are independent of group size and of whether punishment is available or not. We find, first, that …

of the group in the conflict and its members’ utilities vary with the degree of within-group inequality. We show that …