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Garfinkel, Michelle R.; Skaperdas, Stergios; … - Department of Economics, University of California-Irvine - 2010

costs of conflict or self-enforcement swamp the familiar gains from trade for a certain range of world prices. Finally …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008691131

Cumulative Effect of Inequality : A Computational Study of Conflict Models

Takeuchi, Kan - Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University - 2010

This paper examines the relationship between inequality and economic growth using conflict models and computational … simulations. I construct a dynamic sequential conflict model that allows us to observe the cumulative effect of inequalities in … players. The main findings are as follows: (1) if the conflict is not intensive, then the equilibrium that achieves equal …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008694463

Inter-Group Conflict and Intra-Group Punishment in an Experimental Contest Game

Abbink, Klaus; Brandts, Jordi; Herrmann, Benedikt; … - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2007

We study how conflict in a contest game is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to … punish each other. Our main motivation stems from the analysis of socio-political conflict. The relevant theoretical … prediction in our setting is that conflict expenditures are independent of group size and independent of whether punishment is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010652414

Brothers in arms – An experiment on the alliance puzzle

Ke, Changxia; Konrad, Kai A.; Morath, Florian - In: Games and Economic Behavior 77 (2013) 1, pp. 61-76

The generic alliance game considers players in an alliance who fight against an external enemy. After victory, the alliance may break up, and its members may fight against each other over the spoils of the victory. Our experimental analysis of this game shows: In-group solidarity vanishes after...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010603335

Alliances in the Shadow of Conflict

Ke, Changxia; Konrad, Kai A.; Morath, Florian - CESifo - 2012

conflict and more intense fighting. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010603853

Enfranchisement, Intra-Elite Conflict and Bargaining

Ghosal, Sayantan; Proto, Eugenio - Department of Economics, University of Warwick - 2006

Does power sharing between competing elites result in franchise extension to non-elites? In this paper, we argue that competing, risk-averse elites will enfranchise non-elites as in-surance against future, uncertain imbalances in relative bargaining power. We show that negligibly small changes...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005368619

Minority Salience and Political Extremism

Colussi, Tommaso; Isphording, Ingo E.; Pestel, Nico - 2016

This paper studies electoral effects of exposure to religious minorities in the context of Muslim communities in Germany. Using unique data on mosques' construction and election results across municipalities over the period 1980-2013, we find that the presence of a mosque increases political...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011653145

Voting under the Threat of Secession: Accommodation vs. Repression

Anesi, Vincent; Donder, Philippe De - CESifo - 2011

We build a model of secession crises where voters may wish to accommodate the minority to prevent secession. We show the existence of a majority voting equilibrium with a government’s type biased in favor of the minority. We propose a measure of secession risk and perform the comparative...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009021235

Inverse campaigning

Konrad, Kai A. - 2003

It can be advantageous for an office motivated party A to spend effort to make it public that a group of voters will lose from party A's policy proposal. Such effort is called inverse campaigning. The inverse campaigning equilibria are described for the case where the two parties can...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001750281

Social Contracts, Civil Conflicts and International Peacemaking

Murshed, Syed Mansoob - 2008

commitment of donors must not be in doubt. For these conditions to be in place, conflict resolution must be in donors' interests …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014214496