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Rent-seeking Contests under Symmetric and Asymmetric Information

Wasser, Cédric - 2010

We consider a variant of the Tullock rent-seeking contest. Under symmetric information we determine equilibrium strategies and prove their uniqueness. Then, we assume contestants to be privately informed about their costs of effort. We prove existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium and provide a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334145

Understanding the Development of Fundamentalism

Gang, Ira N.; Epstein, Gil S. - 2004

We use economic theory to examine the intensity of fundamentalist sects. Leaders work to enhance their followers? observance level. We model three stylized situations under which fundamentalist groups function, examining the intensity of observance in each. We find that, under reasonable...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261982

Contests Among Bureaucrats

Bös, Dieter - 2002

This paper deals with double lobbying: several bureaucrats participate in joint lobbying to get a high total departmental budget, but they also engage in antagonistic lobbying to reap as high a share of the total budget as possible. The antagonistic lobbying constitutes a contest among the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263072

Mitigating the shadow of conflict: the role of social and human capital for the reduction of conflicts

Schmidt, Dorothee - 2007

One possible solution to mitigate the negative influences of conflict which has been proposed in the literature is to … increasing an individual's social capital will lead her to reduce her conflict effort, whereas increasing her human capital can … induce her to increase her conflict effort. We then analyze which conditions need to be present to induce the individuals to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264810

Parametric contest success functions

Rai, Birendra K.; Sarin, Rajiv - 2007

The key element of models of contest is the Contest Success Function (CSF) which specifies the winning probabilities of agents. We provide an axiomatization of two parametric families of CSF's. In the first, the winning probability of each agent depends on the investments and a vector of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010265674

Incomplete property rights and overinvestment

Amegashie, J. Atsu - 2009

I consider a model in which an asset owner must decide how much to invest in his asset mindful of the fact that an encroacher's valuation of the asset is increasing in the asset owner's investment. Due to incomplete property rights, the encroacher and asset owner engage in a contest over the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010265975

Existence of a pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in imperfectly discriminating contests

Wasser, Cédric - 2010

We consider a general class of imperfectly discriminating contests with privately informed players. We show that findings by Athey (2001) imply the existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in monotone pure strategies.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333804

Differential prize taxation and structural discrimination in contests

Mealem, Yosef; Nitzan, Shmuel - 2012

This paper evaluates differential prize taxation and structural discrimination as a means of increasing efforts in the most widely studied contests. We establish that a designer who maximizes efforts subject to a balanced-budget constraint prefers dual discrimination, namely, change of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282059

Learning by doing in contests

Clark, Derek J.; Nilssen, Tore - 2010

We introduce learning by doing in a dynamic contest. Contestants compete in an early round and can use the experience gained to reduce effort cost in a subsequent contest. A contest designer can decide how much of the prize mass to distribute in the early contest and how much to leave for the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010285593

Democracy, Autocracy and the Likelihood of International Conflict

Tangerås, Thomas - 2008

This is a game-theoretic analysis of the link between regime type and international conflict. The democratic electorate … can credibly punish the leader for bad conflict outcomes, whereas the autocratic selectorate cannot. For the fear of being …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010320243