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Electoral Contests with Dynamic Campaign Contributions

Mattozzi, Andrea - 2017

We study a two-period dynamic principal agent model in which two agents with different unobservable abilities compete in a contest for a single prize. A risk-neutral principal can affect the outcome of the contest by dividing a given budget between agents in each period and her net payoff...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012950346

A new old solution for weak tournaments

Anesi, Vincent - 2010 - Rev. version of 2010-04

-Morgenstern stable sets. -- Electoral competition ; stable set ; stationary Markov equilibrium ; weak tournament ; solution theory …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003990213

The conservation multiplier

Harstad, Bård - 2020

Every government that controls an exhaustible resource must decide whether to exploit it or to conserve and thereby let the subsequent government decide whether to exploit or conserve. This paper develops a theory of this situation and shows when a small probability that some future government...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012213175

Dictators and Their Viziers : Endogenizing the Loyalty-Competence Trade-Off

Egorov, Georgij V.; Sonin, Konstantin - 2011

The possibility of treason by a close associate has been a nightmare of most autocrats throughout history. More competent viziers are better able to discriminate among potential plotters, and this makes them more risky subordinates for the ruler. To avoid this, rulers, especially those which are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014068132

The Role of Information Revelation in Elimination Contests

Zhang, Jun - 2016

In this paper, we investigate how information revelation rules affect the existence and the efficiency of equilibria in two-round elimination contests. We establish that there exists no symmetric separating equilibrium under the full revelation rule and find that the non-existence result is very...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012989369

Clausewitz on Auctions

Häfner, Samuel - 2012

A multi-stage model on the course of war is presented: Individual battles are modeled as private value all-pay auctions with asymmetric combatants of two opposing teams. These auctions are placed within a multi-stage framework with a tug-of-war structure. Such framing provides a microfounded...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011390678

Lottery versus all-pay auction contests : a revenue dominance theorem ; conference paper

Franke, Jörg; Kanzow, Christian; Leininger, Wolfgang; … - 2012

contestants due to softer competition. Our main result regarding total revenue comparison under the optimal biases reveals that … the all-pay auction revenue dominates the lottery contest for all levels of heterogeneity among contestants. The incentive … effect due to a strongly discriminating contest rule (all-pay auction) dominates the participation effect due to a weakly …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010338417