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Bargaining and conflict with up-front investments : how power asymmetries matter

Schaller, Zachary; Skaperdas, Stergios - 2019

-contractible up-front investments to improve their bargaining position and gain advantage for possible future conflict. Bargaining is … efficient ex post, but we show that a player may prefer Conflict ex ante if there are sufficient asymmetries in strength. There … are two sources of this finding. First, up-front investments are more dissimilar between players under Conflict, and they …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012156576

Bargaining and War : On the Communication Equilibrium in Conflict Games

Park, Youngseok; Campbell, Colin M. - 2022

We present a version of Baliga and Sjöström’s (2012a) conflict games with two asymmetric players. The players …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014093382

Introduction to the special issue on contests

Konrad, Kai A.; Kovenock, Daniel J. - In: Economic theory 74 (2022) 4, pp. 1017-1023

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013488783

Separating the Hawks from the Doves : Evidence from Continuous Time Laboratory Games

Oprea, Ryan - 2010

Human players in our laboratory experiment received flow payoffs over 120 seconds each period from a standard Hawk-Dove bimatrix game played in continuous time. Play converged closely to the symmetric mixed Nash equilibrium under a one-population matching protocol. When the same players were...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013139870

Separating the hawks from the doves

Henwood, Keith; Friedman, Daniel; Oprea, Ryan - 2009

Human players in our laboratory experiment converge closely to the symmetric mixed Nash equilibrium when matched in a single population version of the standard Hawk-Dove game. When matched across two populations, the same players show clear movement towards an asymmetric (and very inequitable)...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003921525

Separating the Hawks from the Doves : evidence from continuous time laboratory games

Oprea, Ryan; Henwood, Keith; Friedman, Daniel - 2010

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003994144

Separating the hawks from the doves : evidence from continuous time laboratory games

Oprea, Ryan; Henwood, Keith; Friedman, Daniel - 2010

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009658435

A Theory of Brinkmanship, Conflicts, and Commitments

Schwarz, Michael; Sonin, Konstantin - 2017

Many conflicts and negotiations can be viewed as a dynamic game, where parties have no commitment power. In our model, a potential aggressor demands concessions from the weaker party by threatening a war. The absence of commitment makes a continuous stream of transfers a more effective...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014066643

Wars of conquest and independence

Hodler, Roland; Yektaş, Hadi - 2013

Wars of conquest and wars of independence are characterized by an asymmetric payoff structure: one party gets aggregate production if it wins, and its own production if it loses, while the other party gets only its own production if it wins, and nothing if it loses. We study a model of war with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009754525

Competition Between Auctions

Haruvy, Ernan - 2017

economics literature as isolated. That is, an auction is typically treated as a single seller facing multiple buyers or as a … single buyer facing multiple sellers. In this paper, we review the state of the art of competition between auctions. We … consider three different types of competition: competition between auctions, competition between formats, and competition …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012706633