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. Extending the deadline hurts the players in the first case but is beneficial in the second. When the initial conflict between …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011690720
Using a unique experimental data set, we investigate how asymmetric legal rights shape bargainers’ aspiration levels through moral entitlements derived from equity norms and number prominence. Aspiration formation is typically hard to observe in real life. Our study involves 15 negotiations...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011771180
This paper presents an analysis of general time preferences in the canonical Rubinstein (1982) model of bargaining, allowing for arbitrarily history-dependent strategies. I derive a simple sufficient structure for optimal punishments and thereby fully characterize (i) the set of equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011705183
In the present work, agreement on allocation of payments from multiple issues requires unanimous consent of all parties involved. The agents are assumed to know the aggregate payoffs but do not know their decomposition by issues. This framework applies to many real-world problems, such as the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011671885
conflict by law. Each party is either a justified player who is inflexible about demand and resolves the conflict by law … efficiently. In the limit of complete rationality, the outcome is the Rubinstein outcome if the ultimatum opportunity arrival rate …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012851185
I consider two-person bargaining problems in which mechanism is selected at the almost ex ante stage---when there is some positive probability that players may have learned their private types---and the chosen mechanism is implemented at the interim stage. For these problems, I define almost ex...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012854555
This paper studies independence of higher claims and independence of irrelevant claims on the domain of bargaining problems with claims. Independence of higher claims requires that the payoff of an agent does not depend on the higher claim of another agent. Independence of irrelevant claims...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012859397
We propose a mechanism which implements a unique solution to the bargaining problem with two players in subgame-perfect equilibrium. Players start by making claims and accept a compromise only if they cannot gain by pursuing their claim in an ultimatum. The player offering the lowest resistance...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012723051
In criminal law, when a conflict is solved by plea bargaining, the negotiation is mainly made between the prosecutor …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012764272
We analyze a dynamic model of bargaining and war with rich sets of strategic options. There are two states located on a linear territory. One state demands a portion of the other state's territory each period such that if the latter state makes a concession, the former state takes control of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013322063