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Esteban Marquillas, Joan María; Flamand, Sabine; … - 2018

relative size and the relative surplus contribution of the minority group, conflict followed by secession can occur. Accepted …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011906250

Keep on fighting : dynamic win effects in an all-pay auction

Clark, Derek J.; Nilssen, Tore; Sand, Jan Yngve - 2014 - This version October 16, 2014

We investigate a multi-period contest model in which a contestant.s present success gives an advantage over a rival in the future. How this win advantage affects contestants.efforts, and whether the laggard gives up or keep on fighting are key issues. We find that the expected effort of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010428039

Bidding in Hierarchies

Konrad, Kai A. - 2011

This paper reconsiders the comparison between hierarchical contests and single-stage contests. A condition is given that characterizes whether and when the aggregate equilibrium payoff of contestants is higher in the single-stage contest, and when the single-stage contest is more likely to award...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014073314

Optimal Sequential Contests

Hinnosaar, Toomas - 2018

I study sequential contests where the efforts of earlier players may be disclosed to later players by nature or by design. The model has a range of applications, including rent seeking, R&D, oligopoly, public goods provision, and tragedy of the commons. I show that information about other...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012928173

On the relative sequencing of internal and external rent-seeking contests

Dasgupta, Indraneel; Gupta, Dhritiman - 2024

We consider rent-seeking contests between and within two equal-sized groups. Each group adopts one of three sequences: first internal then external contest, first external then internal contest, and simultaneous internal and external contests. Groups cannot unilaterally postpone a contest...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015162741

The generalized Stackelberg equilibrium of the all-pay auction with complete information

Konrad, Kai A.; Leininger, Wolfgang - 2005

We characterize the equilibrium of the all-pay auction with general convex cost of effort and sequential effort choices … to their choice of timing. In the most prominent equilibrium the player with the lowest cost of effort wins the auction … at zero aggregate cost. -- Sequential all-pay auction ; complete information ; generalized cost ; generalized Stackelberg …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003891850

The generalized Stackelberg equilibrium of the all-pay auction with complete information

Konrad, Kai A.; Leininger, Wolfgang - 2006

In the equilibrium of the all-pay auction with two groups of individual players who move sequentially, only the player … composition. -- Sequential all-pay auction ; complete information ; generalized cost ; generalized Stackelberg game …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003892031

Equilibrium in the symmetric Hirshleifer contest : uniqueness and characterization

Ewerhart, Christian; Sun, Guang-Zhen - 2018

The symmetric two-player Hirshleifer (1989) contest is shown to admit a unique equilibrium. The support of the equilibrium strategy is finite and includes, in particular, the zero expenditure level. We also establish a lower bound for the cardinality of the support and an upper bound for the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011824432

Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium in 2-Contestant Generalized Lottery Colonel Blotto Games

Li, Xinmi; Zheng, Jie - 2022

dominance relationship is impossible between any two distinct equilibria. Furthermore, we provide two sets of sufficient …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013322722

Contest Theory : A Survey

Corchón, Luis C. - 2018

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012935851