We suggest a family bargaining model where human capital investment decisions are made non-cooperatively in a first stage, while day-to-day allocation of time is determined later through Nash bargaining, but with non-cooperative behaviour as the fall-back. One finding is that overinvestment in...

We study the long-run stochastic stability properties of volunteering strategies in finite populations. We allow for mixed strategies, characterized by the probability that a player may not volunteer. A pairwise comparison of evolutionary strategies shows that the strategy with a lower...

Excessively tight and biased policy choices of rule makers can be explained as outcomes of competition among rule makers with over-lapping competencies and diverging perceptions about the optimal framework. Rule makers who have extreme rather than moderate preferences are more likely to take...

This book contains articles on the theory of conflict. Conflict appears in many forms, from a dictator terrorizing his country to organized crime demanding protection money. Among the questions addressed are the conditions which make conflict severe (for example, is class conflict worse than...

Consider a committee that in the past has made a promise not confiscate the profits from a foreign investor. After the investment has taken place, there is a material benefit if the committee decides to default on the earlier promise. But there are also some small moral costs for those who vote...

Consumers may observe previous consumers' choices. They may follow their choices if they think these consumers are better informed. In turn, firms may concentrate on influencing the early consumers. This, in turn, changes the nature of early consumers' choice behavior as a signal for other...