The existing literature on two-sided markets addresses participation externalities, but so far it has neglected pecuniary externalities between competing platforms. In this paper we build a model that incorporates both externalities. In our setup differentiated platforms compete in advertising...

The existing literature on two-sided markets addresses partici- pation externalities, but so far it has neglected pecuniary externalities between competing platforms. In this paper we build a model that incorporates both externalities. In our setup differentiated platforms compete in advertising...

For several years, an increasing number of firms are investing in Open Source Software (OSS). While improvements in such a non- excludable public good cannot be appropriated, companies can benefit indirectly in a complementary proprietary segment. We study this incentive for investment in OSS....

The existing literature on two-sided markets addresses participation externalities, but so far it has neglected pecuniary externalities between competing platforms. In this paper we build a model that incorporates both externalities. In our setup differentiated platforms compete in advertising...

For several years, an increasing number of firms are investing in Open Source Software (OSS). While improvements in such a non-excludable public good cannot be appropriated, companies can benefit indirectly in a complementary proprietary segment. We study this incentive for investment in OSS. In...

The existing literature on "two-sided markets" addresses participation externalities, but so far it has neglected pecuniary externalities between competing platforms. In this paper we build a model that incorporates both externalities. In our setup differentiated platforms compete in advertising...

For several years, an increasing number of firms are investing in Open Source Software (OSS). While improvements in such a non-excludable public good cannot be appropriated, companies can benefit indirectly in a complementary proprietary segment. We study this incentive for investment in OSS. In...

For several years, an increasing number of firms have been investing in Open Source Software (OSS). While improvements in such a non-excludable public good cannot be appropriated, companies can benefit indirectly in a complementary proprietary segment. We study this incentive for investment in...

We consider separately strategic entry and asymmetric information in the design of the settlement policy governing patent disputes, with a focus on <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="AHS013C17">Shapiro's (2003)</xref> consumer protection rule. We show that, when a potential entrant strategically incurs an entry cost before engaging in a patent...

We present a fairly general model in which firms are competitors in a commercial market segment and can invest into a complementary public good like open source software. We show that, contrary to standard predictions, additional contribution to the public good by the government or a new market...