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Half a Century of Public Software Institutions : Open Source as a Solution to Hold-Up Problem

Schwarz, Michael - 2009

We argue that the intrinsic inefficiency of proprietary software has historically created a space for alternative … institutions that provide software as a public good. We discuss several sources of such inefficiency, focusing on one that has not … software must make complementary investments, when the return on such investments depends on future cooperation of the software …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012463702

Half a Century of Public Software Institutions : Open Source as a Solution to Hold-Up Problem

Schwarz, Michael; Takhteyev, Yuri - 2009

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014208047

The value of open source software

Hoffmann, Manuel; Nagle, Frank; Zhou, Yanuo - 2024

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014468710

A Note on Credible Spatial Preemption in an Entry-Exit Game

Murooka, Takeshi - 2012

I investigate how an incumbent firm deters entry by crowding the market, even when the incumbent can withdraw its stores in response to entry. In a two-location model, Judd (1985) shows such spatial entry deterrence is not credible. In contrast, I demonstrate spatial preemption can be credibly...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014178327

Endogenous Communication and Tacit Coordination in Market Entry Games – An Explorative Experimental Study

Andersson, Ola; Holm, Håkan J. - 2011

This paper explores the effects of communication in market entry games experimentally. It is shown that communication increases coordination success substantially and generate inferior outcomes for consumers when market entry costs are symmetric. Such effects are not observed when costs are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014178729

Sorting in Iterated Incumbency Contests

Häfner, Samuel - 2017

This paper analyzes incumbency contests in a large population setting. Incumbents repeatedly face different challengers, holding on to their positions until defeated in a contest. Defeated incumbents turn into challengers until they win a contest against an incumbent, thereby regaining an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012968580

Learning and collusion in new markets with uncertain entry costs

Bloch, Francis; Fabrizi, Simona; Lippert, Steffen - 2011

This paper analyses an entry timing game with uncertain entry costs. Two firms receive costless signals about the cost of a new project and decide when to invest. We characterize the equilibrium of the investment timing game with private and public signals. We show that competition leads the two...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009409636

First-mover disadvantage

Mylovanov, Tymofiy - 2006

This note considers a bargaining environment with two-sided asymmetric information and quasilinear preferences in which parties select bargaining mechanism after learning their valuations. I demonstrate that sometimes the buyer achieves a higher ex-ante payoff if the bargaining mechanism is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010373494

Friends or strangers? : strategic uncertainty and cooperation across experimental games of strategic complements and substitutes

Chierchia, Gabriele; Tufano, Fabio; Coricelli, Giorgio - 2017

. However, this has never been tested on two "opposite poles" of coordination, namely, games of strategic complements and … friendship qualities on friendship's differential impact on uncertainty across games of strategic complements and substitutes. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011660682

Sorting in iterated incumbency contests

Häfner, Samuel; Nöldeke, Georg - 2016

This paper analyzes iterated incumbency contests with heterogeneous valuations in a large population setting. Incumbents repeatedly face different challengers, holding on to their positions until defeated in a contest. Defeated incumbents turn into challengers until they win a contest against an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011569559