Several experiments show that feedback transmission mechanisms mitigate opportunistic behavior in social dilemmas. The source of this effect, especially in a repeated interaction, nonetheless remains obscure. This study provides a novel empirical testbed for channels by which feedback may affect...

We report experimental findings on the impact of network structure on decentralized monitoring and punishment in public goods games. In the environments we study, individuals can only directly monitor and punish their immediate neighbors in an exogenously determined network. We examine...

Why people participate in public good provision is one of the oldest questions in Economics. In the absence of enforcement mechanisms public goods would be under-provided. I develop a dynamic model of forward-looking agents in the presence of social pressure, which provides a potential...

We explore the extent to which information about the social value orientation (SVO) of group members influences contributions to a public good. We compare four networks of information - empty, pair, star and complete. We find that information about SVO has a significant impact on contributions...

When members of one group encounter a norm violation committed by a member of another group, this antisocial behavior is often handled by picking a random member of the community to which the perpetrator belongs and by applying sanctions to him/her. Despite its prevalence, this kind of...

Public good games in coalitional form, such as the ones depicting international environmental agreements for the reduction of a global pollutant, generally foresee scarce levels of cooperation. The incentive to free ride, that increases for higher levels of cooperation, prevents the formation of...

We study the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games with four competing strategies: cooperators, defectors, punishing cooperators, and punishing defectors. To explore the robustness of the cooperation-promoting effect of costly punishment, besides the usual strategy adoption...

We study the evolution of cooperation under the assumption that the collective benefits of group membership can only be harvested if the fraction of cooperators within the group, i.e., their critical mass, exceeds a threshold value. Considering structured populations, we show that a moderate...

We study the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games where, besides the classical strategies of cooperation (C) and defection (D), we consider punishing cooperators (PC) or punishing defectors (PD) as an additional strategy. Using a minimalist modeling approach, our goal is to...

We explored experimentally how threshold uncertainty affects coordination success in a threshold public goods game. Whereas all groups succeeded in providing the public good when the exact value of the threshold was known, uncertainty was generally detrimental for the public good provision. The...