We conduct a contribution game for a real public good and show that when the contributors value the real public good highly, they increase their contributions in each round. Thus, contrary to previous literature, free riding decreases over rounds and the end-game effect is reversed

In this experiment, we endogenize the choice of which contribution scheme is implemented in a public goods game. We investigate three rule-based contribution schemes. In a first step, players agree on a common group provision level using the principle of the smallest common denominator....

Reciprocity can be a powerful motivation for human behaviour. Scholars argue that it is relevant in the context of private provision of public goods. We examine whether reciprocity can resolve the associated coordination problem. The interaction of reciprocity with cost-sharing is critical....

Understanding whether the size of the interacting group has an effect on cooperative behavior has been a major topic of debate since the seminal works on cooperation in the 1960s. Half a century later, scholars have yet to reach a consensus, with some arguing that cooperation is harder in larger...

We design a transboundary public goods (TPG) game, in which participants have simultaneous interaction within and between groups. We design the TPG game under an infinitely repeated situation in order to explore the types of strategies that participants employ in infinitely repeated games. We...

We explain contributions in public goods games with the help of the reciprocity model of Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) by applying some plausible modifications: Most importantly, we assume that subjects overestimate the kindness of their group members. In combination with the finding that...

A social planner allocates heterogeneous capital, which determines agents' cost of providing local public goods. Given a capital allocation, agents choose equilibrium efforts. Using a first-order approximation, we uncover a tradeoff between allocating productive capital to central and periphery...

We model a dynamic public good contribution game, where players are (naturally) formed into groups. The groups are exogenously placed in a sequence, with limited information available to players about their groups’ position in the sequence. Contribution decisions are made by players...

We propose a novel mechanism to mitigate the provisions of public bads in large groups. In the baseline setup, players choose their neighbors, and a greater number of neighbors brings benefits. They also decide whether to provide a public bad that yields benefits to themselves but imposes costs...

Without regulation or agreement, public goods are underprovided and public bads are overprovided. Both problems are usually seen as flip sides of the same coin. In this paper we examine a situation where a public good is good for some agents but bad for others, and this preference is endogenous...