Gregarious behavior of potential prey was explained by Hamilton (1971) on the basis of risk-sharing: The probability of being picked up by a predator is small when one makes part of a large aggregate of prey. This argument holds only if the predator chooses its victims at random. It is not the...

This note describes the effects on human capital formation of rank-order tournaments offering identical prizes to a given share of the ranked contestants. This compensation scheme is thought to resemble the selection processes in different areas of the public administration, particularly in...

Lecture on the first SFB/TR 15 meeting, Gummersbach, July, 18 - 20, 2004: We model the formation of a herd as a game between a predator and a prey population. The predator receives some information about the composition of the herd when he chases it, but receives no information when he chases a...

In a number of papers on their theory of Inequity Aversion, E. Fehr and K. Schmidt have claimed that the theory explains the behavior in many experiments. By virtue of having an infinite number of parameters the theory can predict a wide range of outcomes, from the competitive to the...

This paper shows that Nash equilibria of a local-interaction game are equivalent to correlated equilibria of the underlying game.

The paper provides an explanation for altruistic behavior based on the matching and learning technology in the population. In a infinite structured population, in which individuals meet and interact with their neighbors, individuals learn by imitating their more successful neighbors. We ask...

We examine an evolutionary model with "local interactions," so that some agents may be more likely to interact than others. We show that equilibrium strategy choices with given local interactions correspond to correlated equilibria of the underlying game, suggesting an new interpretation for...