Staaten gewähren Banken oft Garantien, um den Zusammenbruch des Finanzsystems zu verhindern. Diese Garantien müssen aber sobald wie möglich wieder zurückgenommen werden. Zuvor sollten jedoch die möglichen Auswirkungen der Abschaffung einer Garantie untersucht werden. Die so gewonnenen...

How should loan contracts to finance projects in countries with high political risk be designed? We develop a double moral hazard model in which the bank's incentive to mitigate political risk is highest with a non-recourse project finance loan, while for the firm's incentive to manage...

Bank regulation differs across countries. We show that these differences provide incentives to lend across the border. In a theoretical model we derive the foreign bank's credit supply function, showing that in the case of regulatory differences the closer firms are to the border the more likely...