This paper deals with the interplay between economic incentives and social norms in firms. We outline a simple model of team production and provide preliminary results on linear incentive schemes in the presence of a social norm that may cause multiple equilibria. The effect of the social norm...

Quotas for special groups of students often apply in school or university admission procedures. This paper studies the performance of two mechanisms to implement such quotas in a lab experiment. The first mechanism is a simplified version of the mechanism currently employed by the German central...

We measure willingness to pay for privacy in a field experiment. Participants were given the choice to buy a maximum of one DVD from one of two online stores. One store consistently required more sensitive personal data than the other, but otherwise the stores were identical. In one treatment,...

Bei der Reform des weiterführenden Schulzugangs sollte Berlin internationale Erfahrungen nutzen. Es kommt beim Auswahlverfahren auf die Details an. Ein zentrales Verfahren und eine größere Zahl möglicher Schülerwünsche sind entscheidend. Losverfahren sind nicht per se ungerecht. Sie...

Die Reform der Studienplatzvergabe ist verschoben - trotz offensichtlicher Vorteile des neuen Verfahrens. Hochschulen können ihre Studienplätze früher, effizienter und nach eigenen Wünschen vergeben. Strategisches Bewerber-Verhalten zahlt sich nicht mehr aus. Das schafft Chancengleichheit....

Quotas for special groups of students often apply in school or university admission procedures. This paper studies the performance of two mechanisms to implement such quotas in a lab experiment. The first mechanism is a simplified version of the mechanism currently employed by the German central...

We analyze the Spence education game in experimental markets. We compare a signaling and a screening variant, and we analyze the effect of increasing the number of competing employers from two to three. In all treatments, efficient workers invest more often in education and employers pay higher...

We study the voluntary revelation of private information in a labor-market experiment where workers can reveal their productivity at a cost. While rational revelation improves a worker's payoff, it imposes a negative externality on others and may trigger further revelation. Such unraveling can...