This paper revisits the licensing of a non-drastic process innovation by an outside innovator to a Cournot oligopoly. We propose a new mechanism that combines a restrictive license auction with royalty licensing. This mechanism is more profitable than standard license auctions, auctioning...

This paper reconsiders the licensing of a common value innovation to a downstream duopoly, assuming firms observe imperfect signals of the cost reduction induced by the innovation. The innovator adopts a direct revelation mechanism and awards an unrestricted license to the firm that reports the...

We review an asymmetric auction experiment. Based on Plum (1992) private valuations of the two bidders are independently drawn from distinct but commonly known distributions, one of which stochastically dominating the other. We test the qualitative properties of that model of asymmetric...

Dieser Diskussionsbeitrag kommentiert Güths axiomatische Begründung der Zweit-Preis-Auktion. In diesem Zusammenhang wird auch Güths umfangreiche Analyse der Lambda-Auktion durch eine einfache und anschaulich interpretierbare Lösung ersetzt.

Dieser Beitrag informiert über die Bedeutung von Auktionen im Wirtschaftsleben, über Vor- und Nachteile gängiger Auktionsregeln sowie über grundlegende Konzepte und Ergebnisse der Theorie nichtkooperativer Auktionsspiele. Besonderes Gewicht hat die anschauliche Darstellung und kritische...

The third generation UMTS auction in Germany raised an enormous amount of revenue, and at the same time achieved a more competitive market structure than other UMTS auctions in Europe. The present paper explains the design of that auction, and presents a game theoretic explanation of observed...

We consider auction games where, prior to the auction, bidders spend resources to increase their valuations. The market game is solved by solving an equivalent auxiliary social choice problem. We show that standard auctions are fully efficient, whereas reserve price requirements entail a double...

The second-generation GSM spectrum auction in Germany is probably the most clear cut example of a low price outcome in a simultaneous ascending-bid auction. The present paper gives an account of the events, describes the auction rules and market conditions, and provides a theoretical explanation...

This article studies the design of optimal mechanisms to regulate entry in natural oligopoly markets, assuming the regulator is unable to control the behavior of firms once they are in the market. We adapt the Clarke-Groves mechanism, characterize the optimal mechanism that maximizes the...