We use the tools of mechanism design, combined with the theory of risk measures, to analyze how a cash constrained owner of an asset with known stochastic returns raises capital from a population of investors that differ in their risk aversion and budget constraints. The issuer partitions the...

We derive conditions on the learning environment - which encompasses both Bayesian and non-Bayesian processes - ensuring that an efficient allocation of resources is achievable in a dynamic allocation environment where impatient, privately informed agents arrive over time, and where the designer...

The paper aims to provide a possible explanation for the occurrence of uniform, fixed-proportion rules for sharing surplus in two-sided markets. We study a two-sided matching model with transferable utility where agents are characterized by privately known, multi-dimensional attributes that...

We derive the revenue maximizing allocation of m units among n symmetric agents who have unit demand, and who take costly actions that influence their values before participating in the mechanism. The allocation problem with costly actions can be represented by a reduced form model where agents...

We study optimal contest design in situations where the designer can reward high performance agents with positive prizes and punish low performance agents with negative prizes. We link the optimal prize structure to the curvature of distribution of abilities in the population. In particular, we...

Arne Ryde Memorial Lectures Series List -- Contents -- About the Arne Ryde Foundation -- Acknowledgments -- 1 Introduction -- 2 The Sequential Assignment of Heterogeneous Objects -- 3 Dynamic Revenue Maximization with Heterogeneous Objects -- 4 The Stochastic and Dynamic Knapsack Model -- 5...