We study partnership dissolution when valuations are interdependent and only one party is informed. In contrast with the case of private values (Cramton, Gibbons, and Klemperer, 1987), in which efficient trade is feasible whenever initial shares are about equal, there exists a wide class of...

This paper identifies a source of gradualism in bargaining andcontribution games. In the bargaining games we examine, each partycan opt out at any time, and the outside option outcome is assumed todepend on the offers made in the negotiation phase. Specifically, we assumethat (1) making a...

In standard auctions, collusion among buyers eliminates bidding competition despite informational asymmetries. Collusion can, however, be imperfect when the situation involves "externalities" among buyers, that is, when a buyer is worse off if one rival wins the good rather than if nobody gets...

The rules under which jurisdictions (nations, provinces) can deny immigration or expel residents are generally governed by a constitution, but there do not exist either positive or normative analyses to suggest what types of exclusion rules are best. We stylize this problem by suggesting four...

This paper considers discounted repeated games with boundedly rational players. In each period, player i chooses his current action on the basis of his forecast about the forthcoming n[subscript i] action profiles; his assessment of the payoffs he will obtain next depends on his state of mind,...

Operating units must communicate their private information regarding decisions to be taken in organizations. This paper characterizes the optimal communication structures assuming that (i) a decision maker is fired whenever he makes a decision that proves wrong ex post relative to the status...