This paper illustrates the benefits of applying mechanism design techniques to questions in revenue management, in particular to dynamic allocation and pricing problems. It is demonstrated that the solution to a sequential stochastic assignment problem under complete information can also be...

We study the possibility of efficient trade with informationally interdependent valuations. In a model based on the bilateral trade situation studied in Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) efficient trade is only possible in trivial cases where the seller's valuation always exceeds the buyer's...

We study the revenue-maximizing allocation of several heterogeneous, commonly ranked objects to impatient agents with privately known characteristics who arrive sequentially. There is a deadline after which no more objects can be allocated. We first characterize implementable allocation schemes,...

In a sequential bargaining model of coalition formation and payoff M division players form demands for their participation in a coalition. These M demands have some appealing, intuitive features. We characterize the sets of M semi-stable and stable demands vectors for general NTU games using M...

In this paper we analyze a simple non-cooperative bargaining model for coalition formation and payoff distribution for games in coalitional form. We show that under our bargaining regime a cooperative game is core-implementable and if it possesses the property of increasing returns to scale for...

We study the problem of a seller who wants to maximize her revenue in situations where the outcome of the sale affects the nature of the future interaction between agents. We model those situations by assuming that an agent that does not acquire the object for sale incurs an externality that may...