In this paper we show that subtle forms of deceit undermine the effectiveness of incentives.We design an experiment in which the principal has an interest in underreporting the trueperformance difference between the agents in a dynamic tournament...

We examine experimentally how Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) respond to incentives and how they provide incentives in situations requiring trust and trustworthiness.As a control we compare the behavior of CEOs with the behavior of students....

This paper shows that neglecting fairness concerns and decision errors prevents a satisfactory understanding of how competition affects prices.

This paper observes in which way working hours as well as effort respond to a wage increase and we have full control regarding theworkers´ anticipation of the wage increase.

During the last two decades economists have made much progress in understanding incentives, contracts and organisations. Yet, they constrained their attention to a very narrow and empirically questionable view of human motivation. The purpose of this paper is to show that this narrow view of...

A substantial number of people exhibit social preferences, which means they are not solelymotivated by material self-interest but also care positively or negatively for the material payoffs ofrelevant reference agents...

This paper examines the determinants of informal sanctions by a large number of experiments.

This paper underlines that reciprocity has powerful implications for many economic fields. [editors EconBiz].

This paper provides an experimental evidence indicating that incentivecontracts may undermine voluntary cooperation.

In this paper we show that reputation formation in endogenously formed relationships is a decisive determinant for the existence and performance of credit markets. In theabsence of any third party enforcement of debt repayment the contracting parties succeed in establishing stable bilateral...