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Do Shareholder Tender Agreements inform or expropriate shareholders?

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The effect of shareholder rights and information asymmetry on stock-option-related repurchase activity

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Reexamining staggered boards and shareholder value

Cohen, Alma; Wang, Charles C. Y. - In: Journal of financial economics 125 (2017) 3, pp. 637-647

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Does CSR have different value implications for different shareholders?

Chen, Ester; Gavious, Ilanit - In: Finance research letters 14 (2015), pp. 29-35

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Staggered boards and shareholder value : a reply to Amihud and Stoyanov

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Are corporate inversions good for shareholders?

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Reexamining staggered boards and shareholder value

Cohen, Alma; Wang, Charles C. Y. - 2017 - Last revised, May 2017

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Shareholder litigation rights and corporate acquisitions

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Does Pledging of Shares by Controlling Shareholders Always Destroy Firm Value?

Singh, Pranav Pratap - 2018

Controlling shareholders often pledge their ownership in the firm to offer collateral for either their personal loans … modification in the payoff structure can influence the incentives of controlling shareholders and have real effects on firm value … ownership of controlling shareholders and destroy firm value. On the contrary, share pledges for firm loans mitigate problems of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012933687