We examine how repeated interaction can facilitate coordinated turn-taking in a two-player infinitely repeated Volunteer's Dilemma. We conjecture that repetition creates an environment for players to coordinate on the Pareto efficient, but asymmetric pure strategy Nash equilibria of the stage...

This paper studies the evolution and co-evolution of both characteristics of reciprocity - the willingness to reward friendly behavior and the willingness to punish hostile behavior. Firstly, both preferences for rewarding and preferences for punishing can survive in evolution provided...

As is well-known, choices of a decision maker (DM) who attempts self-control in the face of temptation may exhibit menu effects and “non-standard” patterns. Existing models can accommodate some of these patterns but not others; e.g., they can explain self-control undermining menu effects,...

This work evaluates whether by rendering more salient to students their own student-identity it is possible to increase their effort and performance in an IQ-test. The idea is based on the assumption that individuals’ behavior is often influenced by cues that work subconsciously and prime them...

This paper explains the endowment effect, whereby sellers generally demand considerably more for a good than buyers are prepared to pay, and related anomalies. Many decisions, including nominating buying or selling prices, involve uncertainty, and we assert that people experience negative...

Using laboratory markets, this research investigates the impacts of reporting different kinds of aggregated trade information to buyers and sellers who conduct transactions through bilateral/private negotiation. There are a limited number of bargaining rounds or matches between buyer and seller...

chapter 1 Introduction Appendix: a very brief and very simple introduction to game -- chapter 2 Part 2: The ultimatum game -- chapter 3 Part 3: Trust and trustworthiness in everyday life -- chapter 4 Part 4: Cooperation in social dilemmas -- chapter 5 I will if you will: resolving coordination...