We study the representative consumer's risk attitude and efficient risk-sharing rules in a singleperiod, single-good economy in which consumers have homogeneous probabilistic beliefs but heterogeneous risk attitudes. We prove that if all consumers have convex absolute risk tolerance, so must the...

We study the evolution of preferences under perfect and almost perfect observability in symmetric 2-player games. We demonstrate that if nature can choose from a sufficiently general preference space, which includes preferences over outcomes that may depend on the opponent's preference-type,...

This paper analyzes a stochastic model of evolution in normal form games. The long-run behavior of individuals in this model is investigated in the limit where mutation rates tend to zero, while the expected number of mutations, and hence population sizes, tend to infinity. It is shown that...

We study the representative consumer's risk attitude and efficient risk-sharing rules in a singleperiod, single-good economy in which consumers have homogeneous probabilistic beliefs but heterogeneous risk attitudes. We prove that if all consumers have convex absolute risk tolerance, so must the...

We call a correspondence, defined on the set of mixed strategy proles, a generalized best reply correspondence if it (1) has a product structure, (2) is upper hemi-continuous, (3) always includes a best reply to any mixed strategy prole, and (4) is convex- and closed-valued. For each generalized...

If a decision maker, in a world of uncertainty a la Anscombe and Aumann (1963), can choose acts according to some objective probability distribution (by throwing dice for instance) from any given set of acts, then there is no set of acts that allows an experimenter to test more than the Axiom of...

A stochastic myopic best-reply dynamics is said to have property (W), for a given number of players n, if every pure weakly dominated strategy in every n-player game is eliminated in the long-run distribution of play induced by the dynamics. In this paper I give a necessary and sufficient...