In this paper we study a continuous time, optimal stochastic investment problem under limited resources in a market with N firms. The investment processes are subject to a time-dependent stochastic constraint. Rather than using a dynamic programming approach, we exploit the concavity of the...

In a recent paper, Jäger, Metzger, and Riedel (2011) study communication games of common interest when signals are simple and types complex. They characterize strict Nash equilibria as so-called Voronoi languages that consist of Voronoi tesselations of the type set and Bayesian estimators on...

We consider a class of infinite-dimensional singular stochastic control problems. These can be thought of as spatial monotone follower problems and find applications in spatial models of production and climate transition. Let (D,M,μ) be a finite measure space and consider the Hilbert space...

Duesenberry introduced the notion of a ratchet investor who does not tolerate any decline in her consumption rate. We connect the demand behavior of such an agent to the behavior of standard time-additive agents. A ratchet investor demands the running maximum of the optimal plan a conventional...

Experimental evidence stresses the importance of so-called social preferences for understanding economic behavior. Social preferences are defined over the entire allocation in a given economic environment, and not just over one's own consumption as is traditionally presumed. We study the...

We combine general equilibrium theory and théorie générale of stochastic processes to derive structural results about equilibrium state prices.

We study a communication game of common interest in which the sender observes one of infinite types and sends one of finite messages which is interpreted by the receiver. In equilibrium there is no full separation but types are clustered into convex categories. We give a full characterization of...

This paper studies the evolutionary stability of the unique Nash equilibrium of a first price sealed bid auction. It is shown that the Nash equilibrium is not asymptotically stable under payoff monotonic dynamics for arbitrary initial populations. In contrast, when the initial population...

We develop a theory of optimal stopping problems under ambiguity in continuous time. Using results from (backward) stochastic calculus, we characterize the value function as the smallest (nonlinear) supermartingale dominating the payoff process. For Markovian models, we derive an adjusted...

We model and solve Best Choice Problems in the multiple prior framework: An ambiguity averse decision maker aims to choose the best among a fixed number of applicants that appear sequentially in a random order. The decision faces ambiguity about the probability that a candidate - a relatively...