In this paper we study common belief of rationality in strategic-form games with ordinal utilities, employing a qualitative doxastic model of beliefs. We characterize the three main solution concepts for such games, viz., Iterated Deletion of Strictly Dominated Strategies (IDSDS), Iterated...

Unlike the Nash equilibrium, logit quantal response equilibrium is affected by positive affine transformations of players' von Neumann-Morgenstern utility payoffs. This paper presents a modification of a logit quantal response equilibrium that makes this equilibrium solution concept invariant to...

Epistemic game theory formalizes assumptions about rationality and mutual beliefs in a formal language, then studies their behavioral implications in games. Specifically, it asks: what do different notions of rationality and different assumptions about what players believe about…what others...

Starting with a simple economic model of the value of civil litigation from each side's perspective, this paper analyses a wide range of potential litigation cost strategies, settlement offers and negotiations, together with relevant applications and insights from game theory. Specific issues...

We report the results of an experiment on two-stage contests with budget-constrained agents competing to win an exogenously determined prize. We study a class of two-stage contests where in stage 1 agents first compete within their own groups by expending resources, and in stage 2 the winners of...

We extend the sealed-bid k-double-auction mechanism from a single- to two-round game where offers are made simultaneously during each round. If an agreement is reached on round 1, then the traders realize their profit and the game is over. If not, equipped with information about the round 1 bids...

The sealed-bid k-double auction mechanism for two-person bargaining under incomplete information can be extended by providing a bonus for both traders if, and only if, an agreement is reached. Brams and Kilgour (1996) proved that there is a unique level of bonus, namely, half the difference...

We consider mixed populations (N=21) of genuine (humans) and artificial (robots) agents, repeatedly interacting in small groups whose composition is changed randomly from round to round. Our purpose is to study the spread of cooperative or non-cooperative behavior in the population over time by...

We provide a tool to model and solve strategic situations where players' perceptions are limited, in the sense that they may only be aware of, or model, some of the aspects of the strategic situations at hand, as well as situations where players realize that other players' perceptions may be...

We study contests between players who rank uncertain outcomes using two parameters: the mean and the variance. This framework admits situations where players do not obey the axioms of expected utility maximization and represents an interesting modification of the usual assumptions in the contest...