A tournament is a simultaneous n-player game that is built on a two-player game g. We generalize Arad and Rubinstein's model assuming that every player meets each of his opponents twice to play a (possibly) asymmetric game g in alternating roles (using sports terminology, once "at home" and once...

We examine the role of coalitions and their members' private information honesty-cheating strategies within a standard industrial politics tournament model. It is first established that honesty supports a sequential equilibrium in both two- and three-member coalitions. Second, a Lazear-type...

We propose a novel tournament design that incorporates the main properties of a round-robin tournament, a Swiss tournament, and a race. Following an equilibrium analysis, we compare 36 tournament structures inherent in our model and several well-known tournament models from the literature, on...

This paper examines conflicts in which performance is measured by the players' success or failure in multiple component conflicts, commonly termed “battlefields”. In multi-battlefield conflicts, behavioral linkages across battlefields depend both on the technologies of conflict within each...

We study conditional cooperation based on a sequential two-person linear public good game in which a trusting first contributor can be exploited by a second contributor. After playing this game the first contributor is allowed to punish the second contributor. The consequences of sanctioning...

In a simple model of currency crises caused by creditor coordination failure, we show that bailouts that reduce ex post inefficiency will sometimes create ex ante moral hazard but will sometimes enhance the incentives for governments to take preventative actions. This model helps us understand a...

This paper investigates the optimal formation of teams in a tournament. A manager sorts four workers---who differ in their productivity---into two teams. Workers on each team join forces to produce team output, and one team wins a prize; e.g., a bonus package. Two sorting patterns are possible:...

We offer a formal game-theoretic framework that enables the analysis of situations whereby rational individuals with different beliefs and views of the world agree to a shared course of action. We define the notion of a course of action which, unlike a strategy profile, does not require a...

We offer a formal game-theoretic framework that enables the analysis of situations whereby rational individuals with different beliefs and views of the world agree to a shared course of action. We define the notion of a course of action which, unlike a strategy profile, does not require a...

This paper addresses the question of multi-party computation in a model with asymmetric information. Each agent has a private value (secret), but in contrast to standard models, the agent incurs a cost when retrieving the secret. There is a social choice function the agents would like to compute...