The Serial Cost Sharing Rule has been conceived originally for problems where agents ask for different quantities of an homogeneous private good, the sum of which is produced by a single facility. In this context, it is endowed with a variety of desirable equity and coherency properties. This...

In this Paper we provide a strategic explanation for the spontaneous convergence of legal rules, which nevertheless falls short of harmonization across jurisdictions. We identify a free-riding problem and discuss its implications for legal culture, integration, and harmonization. It is argued...

This paper investigates a simultaneous discrete public good provision game with incomplete information. To use the terminology of Admati and Perry (1991), we consider both contribution and subscription games. In the former, contributions are not refunded if the project is not completed, while in...

The authors construct a model in which a first mover decides on its location before it knows the identity of the second mover; joint location results in a negative externality. Contracts are inherently incomplete since the first mover's initial decision cannot be specified. The authors analyze...