Similar Search Results - EconBiz

Protective Behaviour in Matching Models.

Barbera, S.; Dutta, B. - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 1991

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572228

An Exploration of Reputation Formation in Experimental Games.

Brandts, J.; Figueras, N. - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 1997

This paper presents results from experiments with finitely repeated games with complete and incomplete information. We use two treatment variables: the number of rounds the game is played and the value of the probability that reflects the presence of incomplete information.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572232

HOW FAST DO RATIONAL AGENTS LEARN?

VIVES, X. - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 1990

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572244

The Dedline Effect: A Theoretical Note.

Obiols, C.P. - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 1991

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572261

TESTING GAME-THEORETIC MODELS OF FREE RIDING: NEW EVIDENCE OD PROBABILITY BIAS AND LEARNING.

PALFREY, T.R.; ROSENTHAL, H. - Economics Department, Massachusetts Institute of … - 1990

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005574255

Explaining Cooperatiob and Commitment in Repeated Games.

Fudenberg, D. - Economics Department, Massachusetts Institute of … - 1991

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005574258

Folk Theorems : Two-Dimensionality is (Almost) Enough.

Smith, L. - Economics Department, Massachusetts Institute of … - 1992

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005574291

Efficiency and Obsevability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players.

Fudenberg, D.; Levine, D.K. - Economics Department, Massachusetts Institute of … - 1991

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005574324

Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed.

Fudenberg, D. - Economics Department, Massachusetts Institute of … - 1991

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005574331

AN APPROXIMATIVE FOLK THEOREM WITH IMPERFECT PRIVATE INFORMATION.

FUDENBERG, D.; LEVINE, D.K. - Economics Department, Massachusetts Institute of … - 1989

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005574385

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