I describe the theoretical and empirical contributions that rigorous economic analysis can make in improving our understanding of the causes of and the solutions to a variety of international environmental problems. I do this by analyzing and summarizing the intellectual contributions of...

The paper considers an extension of the original Shapley and Shubik (1972) two-sided matching problem to the case of multisided matching with transfereable utility. We investigate existence and properties of stable matchings using the approach of cooperative game theory.

This paper shows the possibility that, under certain conditions, it can be socially optimal for the public firm not to privatise its whole production capacity but to retain a part of it, even when private operation of the production facilities is strictly more cost-efficient than public operation.

Harsh sanctions are conventionally assumed to primarily benefit vulnerable targets. Contrary to this perception, this article shows that augmented sanctions often serve the less vulnerable targets. While decreasing crime, harsher sanctions also induce the police to shift enforcement efforts from...

In this paper, we set up a game theoretical model in which an incumbent and an entrant choose their respective R&D strategies to compete with each other. Our paper contributes to three major debates regarding a firm's R&D strategy; the incumbent's and the entrant's choice between a radical R&D...