In this paper I propose that what social psychologists refer to as social identity is a plausible empirical correlate on the part of the individual to what some philosophers and economists call collective intention. A discussion of an experiment yields the question what kind of mental state...

Game theoretic analyses of Hobbes' Leviathan proliferate. By considering elements of Leviathan, which have been scrutinised inter alia by Gauthier, Hampton and Kavka, I argue that the approach capture Hobbes' notion of obligation insufficiently. I search for a concept of rationality in Hobbes'...

In this paper we model the dynamic interaction of two types of agents, experimenters and imitators, whose behavior is characterized by simple rules of thumb. The agents repeatedly play a one-shot game in which the agent's actions are strategic substitutes.

We consider a game where agents commit to action for two periods. This implies two different patterns of decisions: agents can synchronize or stagger their decisions. We compare the outcomes of both timing patterns, and show that spillovers and strategic interactions are crucial for such a...

This paper shows a new way to approach the analysis of international environmental problems and provides a heuristic 'comparative instrument analysis' using this approach. The conclusion is that economic instruments provide certain desirable properties, especially the achievement of cost...

Various arrangements in vertical relationships have evolved in different countries to attain efficient trading relationships. Vertical relationships in Japan can be identified to have distinctive characteristics in several aspects compared with those in other countries. This study is a...

We present a simple two(-country) by two(-good) differental game model of international trade in which the governments of the two countries play a tariff-setting game. We explicitly derive a unilateral optimum tarifff rate and then a Markov-perfect equilibrium pair of tariff strategies...