In this article, we consider how important developments in game theory have contributed to the theory of industrial organization.

We consider parameterized collections of games without side payments and determine a bound on epsilon so that all sufficiently large games in the collection have non-empty epsilon-cores. The required size of epsilon depends on: (a)the number of approximate player types and the accuracy of this...

In experiments with two-person sequential games we analyze whether responses to favorable and unfavorable actions depend on the elicitation procedure. In our "hot" treatment the second player responds to the first player's observed action while in our "cold" treatment we follow the "strategy...

We introduce the concept of a parameterized collection of games with limited side payments, ruling out large transfers of utility. Under the assumption that the payoff set of the grand coalition is convex, we show that a large game with limited side payments has a non-empty epsilon-core. Our...

We consider conflicts between an incumbent, e.g. government or dominant firm, and potential challengers, e.g. guerilla movement or entrants. It is not uncommon for challengers to win such conflicts despite their lack of resources. They can do this by exploiting a second mover advantage: choosing...

In this paper we discuss the level set method of Joó and how to use it to give an elementary proof of the well-known Sion’s minimax result. Although this proof technique is initiated by Joó and based on the inter-section of upper level sets and a clever use of the topological notion...

The banks in the Dutch chipcard market initially agreed on one chipcard system. One system is attractive for companies as well as consumers. Companies, banks and retailers, prevent costs of duplication, while consumers enjoy the benefits of a widespread acceptance of one card and do not face...