This paper shows that all perfect Bayesian equilibria of a dynamic matching game with two-sided incomplete information of independent private values variety converge to competitive equilibria. Buyers purchase a bundle of heterogeneous, indivisible goods and sellers own one unit of an indivisible...

We propose a simple test of hyperbolic versus exponential preferences in a job search model. More impatient workers search less intensively but also accept lower wages. If agents have hyperbolic preferences, the search effect dominates, so increases in impatience lead to lower exit rates from...

A match is a recursive zero-sum game with three possible outcomes: player 1 wins, player 2 wins or there is a draw. Play proceeds by steps from state to state. In each state players play a "point game" and move to the next state according to transition probabilities jointly determined by their...

This article illustrates concurrent values emanating from mergers in the REIT industry. Prior studies on REIT mergers focused only single merger outcome(s); thereby, ignoring other existing concurrent values. Concurrent values are disentangled using game theory. Results illustrate embedded...

We develop a model with labor-market matching frictions that is subject to a range of shocks, including shocks to matching efficiency and bargaining power, and use the model to examine how monetary policy should respond to such shocks. We show that optimal monetary policy is highly efficient at...

In this paper, we study marriage formation through a two-sided secretary problem approach. We consider individuals with nontransferable utility and two different dimensions of heterogeneity, a characteristic evaluated according to the idiosyncratic preferences of potential partners, and a...

Sequential search problems such as secretary problems can be extended to a natural zero-sum two-player game where the Decision Maker faces an opponent with a similar move set. This paper analyzes the game for a sequential search problem known as the Cayley-Moser problem, which falls under the...

We introduce a neighborhood structure in waiting games where the players decide when to "stop" (exit a market, adopt a technology). The payoff of stopping increases each time a neighbor stops. We show that the dynamic evolution of the network starkly depends on initial parameters and can take...