This paper studies the effects of moral hazard on employment and wage dynamics using a continuous-time competitive search model with aggregate productivity shocks. Unobservable idiosyncratic shocks require employers to design dynamic optimal contracts to incentivize workers to exert effort. To...

We solve for the equilibrium dynamics of information sharing in a large population. Each agent is endowed with signals regarding the likely outcome of a random variable of common concern. Individuals choose the effort with which they search for others from whom they can gather additional...

We study equilibria of dynamic over-the-counter markets in which agents are distinguished by their preferences and information. Over time, agents are privately informed by bids and o ffers. Investors diff er with respect to information quality, including initial information precision, and also...

I study intermediation in networked markets using a stochastic model of multilateral bargaining in which traders compete on different routes through the network. I characterize stationary equilibrium payoffs as the fixed point of a set of intuitive value function equations and study efficiency...

This paper shows that all perfect Bayesian equilibria of a dynamic matching game with two-sided incomplete information of independent private values variety are asymptotically Walrasian. Buyers purchase a bundle of heterogeneous, indivisible goods and sellers own one unit of an indivisible good....

This paper considers a frictional market where buyers and sellers, with unit demand and supply, search for trading opportunities. The analysis focuses on explicit search frictions, allows for two-sided incomplete information, and puts no restriction on agent heterogeneity. In this context, a...

This paper shows that all perfect Bayesian equilibria of a dynamic matching game with two-sided incomplete information of independent private values variety converge to competitive equilibria. Buyers purchase a bundle of heterogeneous, indivisible goods and sellers own one unit of an indivisible...

In this paper we study marriage formation through a two-sided secretary problem approach. We consider individuals with nontransferable utility and two different dimensions of heterogeneity, a characteristic evaluated according to the idiosyncratic preferences of potential partners, and an...

We study an infinitely repeated principal-agent relationship with on-the-job search. On-the-job search is modeled as a dimension of the agent's effort vector that has no effect on output, but raises his future outside option. The agent's incentives to search are increasing in the degree to which...

Building upon the static model of Athey and Ellison (2008), we demonstrate the efficient convergence of dynamic position auctions in the presence of consumer search. The entry of low-quality advertisers does not slow this convergence. Our methods are extensions of those introduced by Cary et al....