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How Complex Do Movie Channel Contracts Need to Be?

Raut, Sumit; Swami, Sanjeev; Lee, Eunkyu; Weinberg, … - In: Marketing Science 27 (2008) 4, pp. 627-641

The motion picture industry is characterized by a dynamic market environment, limited shelf space and product category management, and consequently, complex channel contracts specifying the split of box office revenue between distributors and exhibitors. Although such a contracting practice...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008789835

Multiple Messages to Retain Retailers: Signaling New Product Demand

Desai, Preyas S. - In: Marketing Science 19 (2000) 4, pp. 381-389

-demand manufacturer's signaling strategy depends on three factors: the retailer's stocking costs, the intensity of retail competition, and … stocking costs are low or the advertising effectiveness is high. We then examine the effects of retail competition on the … manufacturer strategy. We find that the slotting allowance plays a more important role when the retail level competition is very …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008789851

Social status and crime

Arbak, Emrah - HAL - 2005

We consider a large population of agents choosing either to engage in a criminal activity or working. Individuals feel varying degrees of selfreproach if they commit criminal acts. In addition, they are concerned with their social status in society, based on others' perceptions of their values....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008791518

Social structure and reputation: the NASDAQ case study

Revest, Valérie; Guennif, Samira - HAL - 2005

In 1996, two investigations conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission and the American Department of Justice reported non-competitive practices among market makers on the NASDAQ. These reports also mentioned the influence of the NASDAQ social structure on market makers' behaviours....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008793027

Can Wages Signal Kindness?

Arbak, Emrah; Kranich, Laurence - HAL - 2005

We model the interaction between an employer and a worker with interdependent preferences in a simple one-shot production process. In particular, we assume that the worker becomes kinder if she senses that her employer is an altruist. We assume that intentions are private information. Thus, the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008793118

Fairness and Group Polarization in the Team Dictator Game.

Cason, T.; Mui, V.L. - Department of Economics, University of Southern California - 1994

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005669949

A Characterization of Natural and Double Implementation in Production Economies.

Yoshiara, N. - Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), Osaka … - 1996

Succeeding Dutta, Sen and Vohra (1995) and Saijo, Tatamitani and Yamato (1995), we define several conditions of natural mechanisms in production economies, and proposed two types of natural mechanisms, that is, the quantity and price-quantity types.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005670064

Industry Development under Alternative Market Structures.

Boyer, M.; Lasserre, P.; Mariotti, T.; Moreaux, M. - Groupe de Recherche en Économie Mathématique et … - 1998

-options model under various assumptions on competition. Investment takes the form of sequential acquisition of indivisible units of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005671156

Equilibria in Non-Cooperative Game I: Perturbations Based Refinements of Nash Equilibrium.

Sadanand, A.; Sadanand, V. - 1992

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005671204

Equilibria in Non-Cooperative Game II: Deviations Based Refinements of N ash Equilibrium.

Sadanand, A.; Sadanand, V. - 1992

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005671205