The paper analyzes the optimal delegation and ownership structure in a setting where the owner of a firm hires a manager to run the firm and to gather information on investment projects. The initial owner has two tasks: monitoring the manager and supervising project choice. Profits depend on...

We analyze the interactions between internal and external control mechanisms in a framework in which the board selects the CEO and then decides whether to retain or dismiss him after observing a signal regarding his ability. The novel aspect of our paper is that we consider both the hiring and...

A small committee has to approve/reject a project with uncertain return. Members have different preferences: some are value-maximizers, others are biased towards approval. We focus on the efficient use of scarce information when communication is not guaranteed, and we provide insights on the...

The article develops an oligopoly model to analyze the potential role of LNG in the liberalization of gas market. The assumptions of the model and its results are then discussed using the forecasts of gas demand and production for the next two or three decades.

We analyze the optimal ownership, delegation and compensation structures when a manager is hired to run a firm and to gather information on investment projects. The initial owner has two tasks: monitoring the manager and supervising project choice. Optimality would require a large ownership...

We analyze the voting behavior of a board of directors that has to approve (or reject) an investment proposal with uncertain return. We consider three types of directors: insiders, who are biased toward acceptance of the project, independent outsiders who want to maximize the firm's profit and...

We analyze the voting behavior of a small committee that has to approve or reject a proposal whose return is uncertain. Members have heterogenous preferences: some members want to maximize the expected value while other members have a bias toward project approval and ignore their private...