We study a class of queueing problems with endogenous arrival times that we formulate as non-cooperative n-person games in normal form with discrete strategy spaces, fixed starting and closing times, and complete information. With multiple equilibria in pure strategies, these queueing games give...

The doctrine of comparable worth rests on an assumption that each job possesses an inherent worth independent of the market forces of supply and demand. Implementation of comparable worth further requires that inherent job worth be measured with reasonable accuracy. This paper reports the...

Supplier selection decisions are characterized by a high degree of uncertainty. We draw upon the behavioral operations management and decision-making literatures to examine factors that lead to the adoption of procedural rationality as a decision strategy. In addition, we emphasize the effect of...

We develop and test an incentive-compatible Conjoint Poker (CP) game. The preference data collected in the context of this game are comparable to incentive-compatible choice-based conjoint (CBC) analysis data. We develop a statistical efficiency measure and an algorithm to construct efficient CP...

We develop online survey experiments to analyze how information about inequality and taxes affects preferences for redistribution. Approximately 4,000 respondents were randomized into treatments providing interactive, customized information on U.S. income inequality, the link between top income...

We study the role of caste and religion in India's new economy sectors--software and call-centers--by sending 3,160 fictitious resumes in response to 371 job openings in and around Delhi (India) that were advertised in major city papers and online job sites. We randomly allocate caste-linked...

Using a student level randomization, we compare three education-based conditional cash transfers designs: a standard design, a design where part of the monthly transfers are postponed until children have to re-enroll in school, and a design that lowers the reward for attendance but incentivizes...