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Chichilnisky, Graciela - 2009

lt is shown that any continuous social aggregation rule for smooth preferences cannot simultaneously satisfy the properties of anonymity and respect of unanimity. This is true even when all individual preferences are linear. The relationship between the conditions on the social rule studied here...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014209615

Arrovian Aggregation Models

Aleskerov, Fuad T. - 1999

Aggregation of individual opinions into a social decision is a problem widely observed in everyday life. For centuries … form of desired social decision. In other words, we study three aggregation models. What is common between them is that in … decision. Chapter 2 formalizes precisely the notion of `rationality' of individual opinions and social decision. Chapter 3 …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013520367

The impossibility of unbiased judgment aggregation

Dietrich, Franz; List, Christian - 2007 - Rev.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003647743

Sen's Theorem : Geometric Proof, New Interpretations

Li, Lingfang (Ivy); Saari, Donald - 2013

Sen's classic social choice result supposedly demonstrates a conflict between Pareto and even minimal forms of liberalism. By providing the first direct mathematical proof of this seminal result, we underscore a significantly different interpretation: rather than conflicts among rights, Sen's...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014048168

Anonymity and Neutrality in Arrow's Theorem with Restricted Coalition Algebras

Mihara, H. Reiju - 2001

In the very general setting of Armstrong (1980) for Arrow's Theorem, I show two results. First, in an infinite society, Anonymity is inconsistent with Unanimity and Independence if and only if a domain for social welfare functions satisfies a modest condition of richness. While Arrow's axioms...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014090226

Escaping Arrow's theorem : the advantage-standard model

Holliday, Wesley H.; Kelley, Mikayla - In: Theory and decision : an international journal for … 98 (2025) 2, pp. 165-204

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015333339

Notions of Anonymity for Object Assignment : Impossibility Theorems

Kondo, Hikaru - 2015

We search for impartiality in the allocation of objects when monetary transfers are not possible. Our main focus is anonymity. The standard definition requires that if agents' names are permuted, their assignments should be permuted in the same way. Since no rule satisfies this definition in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013026959

Social Welfare Functionals on Restricted Domains and in Economic Environments

Bordes, George; Hammond, Peter J.; Le Breton, Michel - 1998

Arrow's "impossibility" and similar classical theorems are usually proved for an unrestricted domain of preference profiles. Recent work extends Arrow's theorem to various restricted but "saturating" domains of privately oriented, continuous, (strictly) convex, and (strictly) monotone "economic...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014064337

The impossibility of unbiased judgment aggregation

Dietrich, Franz; List, Christian - 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003199048

Taking alleged dictatorship more seriously: rejoinder to Fried

Quesada, Antonio - In: Public choice 158 (2013) 1/2, pp. 253-259

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365307