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Positive and Negative Selection in Bargaining : An Experiment

Chang, Dongkyu; Kim, Duk Gyoo; Lim, Wooyoung - 2022

We consider infinite-horizon bargaining in which an uninformed seller sequentially makes a price offer to a privately informed buyer who decides whether to accept or reject it in every bargaining round. Existing theories suggest that the presence (absence) of an arbitrarily small outside option...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014077327

Reputation or Gain : Examining Deception and Generosity Among Children in a Bargaining Ultimatum Game

Shayestehfar, Monir; Zarei, Sahar; Hariri, Rabee; … - 2022

to split a monetary resource with a hypothetical responder. Our modified bargaining experiment employed rounds and trials …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014081325

Preference Information and Social Value Orientations as Offerer's Intention in Ultimatum Bargaining

Fukuno, Mitsutera; Ohbuchi, Ken-ichi - 2003

offerer in the experiment. The chip offer was turned into cash according to the bargaining outcome but the monetary value of a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014085653

Social Comparisons in Ultimatum Bargaining

Bohnet, Iris; Zeckhauser, Richard - 2003

This paper experimentally examines the effect of social comparisons in ultimatum bargaining. While previous experiments and the theoretical models on fairness focus on the two bargaining counterparts, we address a new reference group - others in like circumstances. We inform responders on how...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014107877

When Knowledge Isn't Power : Asymmetric Information, Probabilistic Deceit Detection and Threats in Ultimatum Bargaining

Ferreira, Mark - 2016

We find that probabilistic deceit detection and cheap-talk threats enhance the fairness and honesty of a bargainer who possesses advantageous information and has the opportunity to be deceitful. In our ultimatum game, only proposers know the size of the pie. Proposers, therefore, have the option...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013003880

Bargaining With Charitable Promises : True Preferences and Strategic Behavior

Lange, Andreas; Schwirplies, Claudia - 2021

We report experimental findings on the role of charitable promises in bargaining settings. We vary the enforceability of such promises within variants of ultimatum games where the proposer suggest a split between himself, the responder and a charitable donation. By reneging on initial pledges,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013223664

Social Asymmetries and Bargaining in the Ultimatum Game : A Compared Study

Fajfar, Pablo Francisco - 2006

The present paper analyzes the dynamics of bargaining of the ultimatum game in presence of social differences amidst the participants. To that end, two parallel experiments were set-up. One where the social status states of the individuals were of common knowledge (alternative version) and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014026906

Fair, Efficient and Envy-Free Bargaining : An Experimental Test of the Brams-Taylor Adjusted Winner Mechanism

Daniel, Terrence (Terry) E.; Parco, James E. - 2008

The Adjusted Winner mechanism for two-player bargaining has been theoretically shown to produce fair (efficient and envy-free) outcomes (Brams and Taylor 1996). We study this claim experimentally in a bilateral bargaining game of incomplete information for two divisible goods using three...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014027622

An Experimental Analysis of Needs in Ultimatum Bargaining

J; Thorisdottir, Hulda - 2005

concerned with fairness. In Experiment 1, participants were proposers, and we experimentally varied what the responder … Experiment 2, where participants were in the responder role and received a pathetic offer of 1 out of 19 lottery tickets. When … agreement in negotiation. The data also suggest some practical advice: to have the best chance of having your offer accepted in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014027998

Enhancing Honesty in Bargaining Under Incomplete Information : An Experimental Study of the Bonus Procedure

Parco, James E.; Rapoport, Amnon - 2008

The sealed-bid k-double auction mechanism for two-person bargaining under incomplete information can be extended by providing a bonus for both traders if, and only if, an agreement is reached. Brams and Kilgour (1996) proved that there is a unique level of bonus, namely, half the difference...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014028811