The Maschler-Perles solution is the unique bargaining solution which is superadditive and satisfies the usual covariance properties. We provide two proofs for superadditivity that do not rely on the standard traveling time.

A cephoid is an algebraic ("Minkowski") sum of finitely many prisms in R^n. A cephoidal game is an NTU game the feasible sets of which are cephoids. We provide a version of the Shapley NTU value for such games based on the bargaining solution of Maschler-Perles.

An increasing number of countries have introduced some form of prohibition of abuses of economic dependence or broadened the scope of their existing legislation. Yet, very little has been written on the economics of economic dependence, that is on economic reasoning, tools or metrics that can be...

Survey data for this paper were collected in a rural district in Kenya between December 2000 and January 2001. The main objective was to identify the factors determining female participation in household decision making. Our results suggest that bargaining models and resource theory cannot be...

The infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma has a multiplicity of Pareto-unranked equilibria. This leads to a battle of the sexes problem of coordinating on a single efficient outcome. One natural method of achieving coordination is for the players to bargain over the set of possible equilibrium...

This article evaluates the feminist and institutional dimensions of intra-household economics. A brief intellectual history of this emerging subfield of microeconomics argues that the weakness of the New Home Economics lies not only in its failure to deal with the individuals that make up the...

At each moment in time, some alternative from a finite set is selected by a dynamic process. Players observe the alternative selected and sequentially cast a yes or a no vote. If the set of players casting a yes–vote is decisive for the alternative in question,the alternative is accepted...

In this article, I critically respond to Herbert Gintis's criticisms of the behavioral-economic foundations of Ken Binmore's game-theoretic theory of justice. Gintis, I argue, fails to take full account of the normative requirements Binmore sets for his account, and also ignores what I call the...