The study of trade and conflict has largely focused on dyadic interdependence, or trade within discrete pairs of states. Yet, states may also be indirectly interdependent, by way of trade to third parties. This paper examines the influence of third-party trade on dyadic conflict initiation. I...

Lloyd Shapley is considered one of the pioneers of game theory. His most prominent contributions are the inception and study of value theory and core theory. These two theories are the key to solving problems involving the allocation of goods or payoffs achievable through cooperation....

The application of game theory and cognitive economy to analyze the problem of undesired location - The analysts of the processes of public bodies decision - taking have long been discussing on the establishment of proper strategies to manage "environmental conflicts" - above all the so-called...

This book introduces new concepts for cooperative game theory, and particularly solutions that determine the distribution of a coalitional surplus among the members of the coalition. It also addresses several generalizations of cooperative game theory. Drawing on methods of welfare economics,...

AbstractThe following sections are included:An Overview of the ModelFCS GamesConsiderable Solutions in FCS GamesThe CoreDetermination of the Feasible Condition StructuresA Coalition for Production and SaleA Production-and-Sale Coalition in a Steady StateOptimality within the CoalitionBargaining...

AbstractThe following sections are included:PreliminariaTU Games in Partition Function FormSymmetrySuperadditivityEfficiencySuccessor FunctionNTU Games in Partition Function FormSuperior GamesExample: A Common-Property ResourceExample: A Cartel with Differentiated ProductsChapter Summary

AbstractThe following sections are included:Nontransferable Utility GamesZeuthen's SolutionNash Bargaining with Equal Bargaining PowerVariable-Threat BargainingNash Bargaining and Nash EquilibriumUnequal Bargaining PowerChapter Summary

AbstractThe following sections are included:A Brief Digression on the Noncooperative Stage of a Biform GameBargaining Power Biform GamesBiform Games and ExternalitiesSome Examples from the Recent LiteratureBrandenburger and Stuart (2007)Chatain and Zemsky (2007)Biform Games and Job MatchingA...

AbstractThe following sections are included:ExcessThe NucleolusUniquenessCharacterizing the CoreThe Intermediate Case and Proper GamesExtended CoreSuperior GamesThe Example of a Common-Property ResourceThe Example of a CartelSummary and Conclusions

AbstractThe following sections are included:Bargaining Power GamesExamplesThe Relation of this Model to Some PredecessorsMatching Games and Bargaining PowerBargaining Power NTU Games in Partition Function FormReflectionsSummary