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AbstractThe following sections are included:Shapley's “Algorithm”Maskin's ProposalAn Extended Shapley AlgorithmSome ExamplesAn Illustrative ExampleA Game with Strong Positive ExternalitiesA Game with Mild Positive ExternalitiesA Game that is not SuperadditiveThe Enigma GameAn Exceptional...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011206612
AbstractThe following sections are included:A Primer for Cooperative Games in Extensive FormFurther ExamplesAn Example with Demographic ChangeA More General DiscussionChapter Summary and Conclusions
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011206629
AbstractThe following sections are included:Superadditive Games in Coalition Function FormThe CoreShapley ValueThe NucleolusA Comparative PerspectiveChapter Summary
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011206750
We study strategic negotiation models featuring costless delay, general recognition procedures, endogenous voting orders, and finite sets of alternatives. Two examples show 1. non-existence of stationary subgame-perfect equilibrium SSPE. 2. the recursive equations and optimality conditions are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011183211
contrast, cheap signals can disrupt intrastate negotiations, which makes conflict more likely by increasing the likelihood that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010801740
We consider a class of perfect information unanimity bargaining games, where the players have to choose a payoff vector from a fixed set of feasible payoffs. The proposer and the order of the responding players is determined by a state that evolves stochastically over time. The probability...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010856551
We analyze the Condorcet paradox within a strategic bargaining model with majority voting, exogenous recognition probabilities, and no discounting. Stationary subgame perfect equilibria (SSPE) exist whenever the geometric mean of the players' risk coefficients, ratios of utility differences...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010856552
We study the division of a surplus under majoritarian bargaining in the three-person case. In a stationary equilibrium as derived by Baron and Ferejohn 1989, the proposer offers one third times the discount factor of the surplus to a second player and allocates no payoff to the third player, a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010856562
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010862764
Research on multiparty negotiation has investigated how parties form coalitions to secure payoffs but has not assessed the underlying self-regulatory and physiological principles. Integrating insights from research on the social functions of emotions and the bio-psychosocial model as proposed by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011051382