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We analyze a continuous-time bilateral double auction in the presence of two-sided incomplete information and a smallest money unit. A distinguishing feature of our model is that intermediate concessions are not observable by the adversary: they are only communicated to a passive auctioneer. An...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572163
This article provides an overview of the main events in the life of John Harsanyi and a summary of his research on decision-theoretic foundations for utilitarianism, cooperative bargaining theory, games of incomplete information, and equilibrium selection in noncooperative games.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005585326
It seems reasonable to suppose that in repeated games in which communications is possible, play is determined through a process of negotiation and renegotiation as events unfold. In the absence of a satisfying theory of players' bargaining power, it is unclear how to model this process....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593208
Before Kahneman and Tversky showed how behavioural economics could bring psychology and economics into a unified framework, in the 1950s a social psychologist, Sidney Siegel, entered the realm of economics and laid the foundation of experimental economics. This paper gives an assessment of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005766571
A matching and bargaining model in a market with one seller and two buyers, differing only in their reservation price, is analyzed. No subgame perfect equilibrium exists for stationary strategies. The authors demonstrate the existence of inefficient equilibria in which the low buyer receives the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005749740
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This short paper demonstrates that the equilibrium payoffs of an alternating-offers bargaining game over a unit of surplus converge to equal division provided that the parties are allowed to bargain over all the surpluses generated by the "right" to be the first to make offers. The result...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008552159
For two-person complete-information strategic games with transferable utility, all major variable-threat bargaining and arbitration solutions coincide. This conuence of solutions by luminaries such as Nash, Harsanyi, Rai¤a, and Selten, is more than mere coincidence. Staying in the class of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010592134