A simple two-person distribution game similar to the ultimatumgame is introduced. However, unlike the standard ultimatumgame, responders can determine the payoff for the proposerin case of rejection. Therefore, they can express their concerns inmonetary quantities. The experimental data are...

It is commonly accepted that face-to-face communication inducescooperation. The experiment disentangles communication and socialeffect (replication of Roth, 1995) and examines the components of thesocial effect with the help of unilateral communication. Results suggestthat separate processes,...

We model deferred compensation as a share of an uncertain futureprofit granted by a financially constrained employer to her employeein mutual agreement. Deferred compensation serves as a retentionmechanism, helping the employer to avoid bankruptcy. The optimalcombination of cash and deferred...

We study the influence of gender on economic decision making in a two-person bargaining game. By testing hypotheses derived from evolutionary psychology and social role theory, we find that (1) gender per se has no significant effect on behavior, whereas (2) gender pairing systematically affects...

Economic decisions have been shown to depend on actual outcomes as well as perceived intentions. In this paper, we examine wether and how the relative importance of outcomes or intentions for economic decision develops with age. We report the resullt of ultimatum games with children, teens and...

To commit credibly in bargaining is crucial: In the ultimatum game with its one–sided early commitment power the “proposer” gets (nearly) the whole pie while the“responder” is left with (almost) nothing. When both parties commit simultaneouslythe (a)symmetric Nash(1950)–bargaining...

In this note we establish that rational demand expectations willtypically not evolve in an evolutionary model. In an evolutionarymodel beliefs act like a commitment device to more aggressive be-havior. This commitment effect has the same direction for strategicsubstitutes and complements and...

This paper analyses individual information acquisition in an ultimatum game with aprioriunknown outside options. We find that while individual play seems to accord reasonablywell with the distribution of empirical behavior, contestants seem to grossly overweighthe value of information. While...

In experimental bargaining with incomplete information, we vary the information distribution (symmetric and asymmetric), the direction of electronic prepaycommunication (no, one-way, and two way), and the electronic communication medium (email and video) Bargainig outcomes are influenced by the...