We examine the strategic behavior of first and second movers in a two party bargaining game with uncertain information transmission. When the first mover states her demand she does only know the probability with which the second mover will be informed about it. If the second mover is informed,...

The variable threat-bargaining model of Nash (1953) assumes that threats in the senseof binding commitments as to what one will do if bargaining ends in conflict, are chosenbefore bargaining. By comparison, late threats to be chosen after bargaining end in conflict,appear more natural and would...

In a large scale newspaper experiment 5,132 readers of the German weekly, Die Zeit, participated in a three-person bargaining game. In our data analysis we focus on (1) the influence of age, gender, profession and the medium chosen for participation on bargaining behavior and on (2) the external...

Threat power is the ability to impose a great loss on someone else at relativelylow own cost and can be measured by the ratio of other’s and own loss. It can bevaried by assuming that rejecting an ultimatum reduces the payoff of the proposerto its lambda–share and that of the responder to...

In this paper we study the robustness of the deadline effect in bargaininggames using constant and slowly decreasing pies, different time horizons,and both constant and alternating role modes. With decreasing pies efficiency requires early agreements while constant pies allow for efficient late...

This paper estimates the issuers' demand for the banker's underwriting service across different varieties of equity-linked securities.

This paper shows how this becomes an informational first-mover advantage that turns innovators into the market leader.

We introduce bargaining power in a moral hazard framework whereparties are risk-neutral and the agent is ¯nancially constrained. Weshow that the same contract emerges if the concept of bargaining poweris analyzed in either of the following three frameworks; a standard P-Aframework by varying...

Die vorliegende Arbeit besteht aus drei eigenständigen Teilen, die sich in ihrer Form jeweils an wissenschaftlichen Aufsätzen orientieren. Es wird jeweils ein Modell zu den wichtigsten Verhandlungsformen {bilateral, monopolistisch und polylateral) vorgestellt, analysiert und diskutiert.(...)